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AN AICPA REQUIREMENT
FOR AUDIT COMMITTEES:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
By
Special Committee on Audit Committees
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

MARCH 31, 1978

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING AND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS

The Special Committee on Audit Committees urges interested parties to consider the issues
discussed in this booklet as well as others they consider relevant. The committee will hold a public
hearing on May 31, 1978, at the Hyatt Regency O’Hare in Chicago, Illinois. It will begin at 9 a.m.
and continue as long as necessary to accommodate all those who request time to be heard.
Those who desire to make oral presentations should observe the following procedural require
ments.
May 10, 1978

Notification in writing of intent to make an oral presentation, including the
names of the individuals who will make the presentation, the organization
they represent (if any), and the amount of time desired.

May 17, 1978

Submission of fifteen copies of written comments or summaries of proposed
oral presentations.

Those who do not desire to make oral presentations, but who wish to submit written comments,
should do so by May 31, 1978.
Requests to appear at the public hearing, written comments, and summaries should be ad
dressed to
D. R. Carmichael
American Institute of CPAs
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036

Written comments and a transcript of the public hearing will be available for inspection at the
AICPA offices in New York, and copies will be available for a reasonable fee.

An AICPA Requirement for Audit Committees:
An Analysis of the Issues

SUMMARY

The Special Committee on Audit
Committees was appointed to study
whether the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants should
require that companies establish
audit committees of their boards of
directors as a condition of an audit
by an independent public account
ant. If audit committees are to be
required, the special committee is
to propose a plan for the adoption
of the requirement. This booklet
describes the issues related to the
study. The committee urges in
terested parties to consider these
issues as well as others they con
sider relevant.

Impetus for Audit Committee
Requirement
Voluntary establishment of audit
committees has been widely advo
cated. The board of directors of
the AICPA has recommended that
publicly owned corporations estab
lish audit committees. The Corpo
rate Directors Guidebook prepared
by a subcommittee of the American
Bar Association recommends the
establishment of audit committees.
The New York Stock Exchange
has long advocated audit commit
tees, and effective June 30, 1978,
listed companies of the Exchange
must have audit committees of in
dependent directors.
A bill proposed in the Senate in
1976 would have required com
panies to establish audit commit
tees of outside directors. A recent
report of a House subcommittee
recommended that the SEC require
audit committees, and a report by
a Senate subcommittee recom
mended that the accounting pro
fession or the SEC require audit

committees as a condition for an
independent audit.
The report of the Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities states
that audit committees should be
formed if appropriate to the size
and circumstances of the corpora
tion.
In a number of recent enforce
ment actions by the SEC, compa
nies have been required to establish
audit committees. SEC Chairman
Harold M. Williams has recently
called on the AICPA to require
audit committees.

Issues to Be Considered
The following are the issues on
which the committee is requesting
comments. The considerations un
derlying these issues are described
later in this booklet.

1. Should audit committees be
required—
a. To assist independent direc
tors in fulfilling their respon
sibilities?
b. For an auditor to be able to
fulfill
his
responsibilities
under generally accepted
auditing standards?
c. To strengthen auditor inde
pendence?
2. If audit committees are to be
required, should the requirement
apply to—
a.
All public entities?
b.
All SEC registrants?
c.
Certain SEC registrants?
3. What should be the require
ments for the composition of the
audit committee and the qualifica
tions for membership?
a. Should all members of the
audit committee be indepen
dent of management, or is it
3

sufficient that a majority be
independent?
b. Could the full board of direc
tors qualify effectively as an
audit committee?
c. How should “independence”
of directors be defined?
d. What other qualifications
should be required?
4. Should a requirement for
audit committees specify duties to
be performed by the committee?
5. If the AICPA should require
audit committees, should the re
quirement be implemented in the
form of—
a. An amendment of the AICPA
Code of Professional Ethics
rule on independence?
b. A Statement on Auditing
Standards as necessary for the
auditor to fulfill his responsi
bilities under generally ac
cepted auditing standards?
c. A membership requirement of
the SEC practice section of
the AICPA Division for CPA
Firms?
6. If an audit committee require
ment should not be adopted by the
AICPA, should it be implemented
in some other manner?
7. Will a requirement for audit
committees have an economic or
competitive impact on public ac
counting firms?

As a supplemental issue, the
committee has also been asked to
consider whether the independent
auditor should be required to be
present and available to answer
questions at the annual meeting of
stockholders. While this issue is
not directly related to audit com
mittees, it does involve similar
questions of applicability and im
plementation.
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BACKGROUND

The concept of audit committees
is not new. Audit committees first
received major attention in the late
1930s, and in the last ten years
there has been a significant in
crease in the number of corpora
tions that have formed audit com
mittees. A 1970 survey showed that
32 percent of the corporations re
sponding had audit committees,
while a repeat of the survey in 1976
showed that 87 percent had audit
committees.1 Many audit commit
tees have been formed at the rec
ommendation of corporate directors
or management or at the suggestion
of independent auditors. Actions
by Congress, the SEC, the New
York Stock Exchange, the AICPA,
and others have also added to the
impetus for forming audit commit
tees.
Congress

Congress has recently expressed
interest in audit committees, and
several recommendations
have
been made to require corporations
having securities registered with
the SEC to establish audit com
mittees.
Senate bill 3379, introduced May
5, 1976, by Senators Church, Clark,
and Pearson in response to the pub
licity involving questionable cor
porate payments, had as one of its
requirements that companies estab
lish audit committees made up of
outside directors. The bill also
would have required that outside
directors constitute at least one
third of the total board member
ship.
In September 1976, the Subcom
mittee on Oversight and Investiga
tions of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce
(the Moss subcommittee)2 recom1 R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann, Cor
porate Audit Committees: Policies and
Practices (Cleveland: Ernst & Ernst,
1977), pp. 8-11.
2 U.S., Congress, House of Representa
tives, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigation of the Committee on Inter
state and Foreign Commerce, Federal
Regulation and Regulatory Reform,
1976, p. 52.

mended that the SEC promulgate
rules concerning corporate boards
of directors to assure that—

• A majority of the board is in
dependent of senior manage
ment and operating execu
tives and from any other con
flicts of interest.
• The board’s audit and nomi
nating committees have a ma
jority of independent direc
tors.
• The board’s audit committee
has available to it independent
expert advisors.
• The board has the authority to
engage and dismiss the inde
pendent auditor.
The Subcommittee on Reports,
Accounting and Management of
the Senate Committee on Govern
mental Affairs (the Metcalf sub
committee) stated in its report:
The subcommittee strongly believes
that the accounting profession or
the SEC should immediately re
quire that publicly owned corpora
tions establish audit committees
composed of outside directors as a
condition for being accepted as a
client by an independent auditor.3

Securities and Exchange
Commission
In 1940, as a result of the McKes
son & Robbins case, the SEC rec
ommended the “establishment of a
committee to be selected from nonofficer members of the board of
directors which shall make all com
pany or management nominations
of auditors and shall be charged
with the duty of arranging the de
tails of the engagement.” Also in
cluded was a recommendation for
the current election of auditors at
the annual meetings of stockhold
ers.4 In 1972, while citing its previ
3 U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee
on Reports, Accounting and Manage
ment of the Committee on Governmen
tal Affairs, Improving the Accountability
of Publicly Owned Corporations and
Their Auditors, 1977, p. 13.
4 SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 19,
December 5, 1940.

ous recommendation and the 1967
recommendation of the AICPA, the
SEC endorsed the establishment of
audit committees by all publicly
held corporations.5 The stated in
tention of these recommendations
was to impress on the auditor his
responsibilities to investors, partic
ularly the need for independence.
The SEC noted, “The existence of
an audit committee of the board of
directors, particularly if composed
of outside directors, should also
strengthen such independence.”6
In 1974, the SEC amended its
regulation 14A to require disclosure
in proxy statements stating whether
the board of directors has an audit
committee and, if so, the names of
the committee members.7
In recent years, the SEC has re
quired, as a result of enforcement
proceedings, that individual cor
porations establish audit commit
tees. In some cases, the SEC has
specified the duties to be per
formed by the audit committees.
For example, in SEC v. Killearn
Properties, Inc. the list of duties
imposed on the audit committee
was quite explicit. In addition to
duties relating to the review of the
independent audit, it required the
audit committee to review (1) the
company’s code of conduct and de
viations from it, (2) all public re
leases of financial information, and
(3) activities of officers and direc
tors in dealing with the company.8*
In response to the recommenda
tion of the Moss and Metcalf sub
committees, the SEC has urged the
AICPA to require audit committees
5 SEC, Accounting Series Release No.
123, March 23, 1972.
6 SEC, Accounting Series Release No.
126, July 5, 1972.
7 SEC, Accounting Series Release No.
165, December 20, 1974.
8 Summaries of the SEC’s findings in its
investigation of National Telephone Co.,
Inc., and of SEC v. Killearn Properties,
Inc., No. TCA-75-67 (N.D.Fla. May
1977), are included in Appendixes C
and D. Audit committees were also re
quired by the SEC in settlements of
two other lawsuits, SEC v. Mattel, Inc.,
No. 74 Civ. 1185 (D.D.C. October 1,
1974), and SEC v. Lum’s, Inc., No. 71
Civ. 5323 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 1974).
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as a condition of an independent
audit. Speaking at the AICPA
Fifth National Conference on Cur
rent SEC Developments on Janu
ary 4, 1978, Harold M. Williams,
chairman of the SEC, stated—
The profession must take whatever
steps are reasonably available to it
— such as insisting that their clients
maintain audit committees — to in
sure and enhance its independence.
If the profession is reluctant to take
steps of that nature voluntarily and
of its own accord, the Commission
will need to understand why and
how that reluctance can be recon
ciled with a profession which de
sires to maintain the initiative for
self-regulation and self-discipline.

Chairman Williams indicated
that this project will be one of the
central issues in the SEC’s first an
nual report to Congress on the ac
counting profession to be submitted
by July 1, 1978.
New York Stock Exchange

The first major endorsement for
the establishment of audit commit
tees came from the New York Stock
Exchange in 1939 as a result of the
McKesson & Robbins case. The Ex
change’s report stated, "Where
practicable, the selection of the
auditors by a special committee of
the board composed of directors
who are not officers of the company
appears desirable.” 9
For over twenty years, the Ex
change has required all newly
listed companies to have at least
two outside directors. In 1973, the
Exchange published a “white
paper” which stated that an audit
committee “no longer represents a
corporate luxury, but has become a
necessity.” 10 At the urging of the
9 New York
dent Audit
Accountant,
10 New York

Stock Exchange, “Indepen
and Audit Procedures,”
April 6, 1940, pp. 383-87.
Stock Exchange, “Response

SEC, the Exchange has adopted a
requirement that as of June 30,
1978, each domestic company with
common stock listed on the Ex
change must establish and maintain
“an Audit Committee comprised
solely of directors independent of
management and free from any re
lationship that, in the opinion of its
Board of Directors, would interfere
with the exercise of independent
judgment as a committee mem
ber.” 11 The Exchange’s require
ment was approved by the SEC on
March 9, 1977.

American Institute of CPAs
In 1967, through a statement of
its executive committee, the AICPA
recommended that “publicly owned
corporations appoint committees
composed of outside directors
(those who are not officers or em
ployees) to nominate the indepen
dent auditors of the corporation’s
financial statements and to discuss
the auditors’ work with them.”12
In July 1977, the AICPA Board
of Directors again urged the estab
lishment of audit committees and
urged AICPA members to encour
age corporations to establish audit
committees. The board has also
asked the American Stock Ex
change and regional exchanges to
adopt audit committee require
ments similar to the requirement of
the New York Stock Exchange.

to the White Paper Questionnaire Con
cerning Recommendations and Com
ments on Financial Reporting to Share
holders and Related Matters” (New
York: NYSE, 1973), p. 2.
11 New York Stock Exchange, William M.
Batten letter to chief executive officers
of listed companies, January 6, 1977.
The text of the requirement is included
in Appendix A.
12 AICPA Executive Committee Statement
on Audit Committees of Boards of Di
rectors, Journal of Accountancy, Sept.
1967, p. 10.

Commission on Auditors'
Responsibilities

In its report issued in January,
1978, the Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities stated—
The board of directors, with outside
members and an audit committee
when appropriate, is the best ve
hicle for achieving and maintaining
balance in the relationship between
the independent auditor and man
agement. Therefore, the Commis
sion believes that steps should be
taken by boards, auditors, and
when necessary, by regulatory au
thorities to help assure that boards
will actively exercise this oppor
tunity. Where appropriate to the
. size and circumstances of the corpo
ration, board membership should
include independent outsiders, and
an audit committee should be
formed.13

Others

The Corporate Directors Guide
book, prepared by a subcommittee
of the American Bar Association,
states that it is desirable that
boards of directors establish audit
committees.14*
A recently enacted statute of
Connecticut requires that certain
corporations of that state with at
least one hundred stockholders
must establish audit committees.
In Canada, audit committees are
mandatory under the statutes of
the provinces of Ontario, Manitoba,
and British Columbia and for fed
erally chartered companies under
the Canada Business Corporations
Act of 1975.
13 Commission on Auditors’ Responsibili
ties, Report, Conclusions, and Recom
mendations (New York: AICPA, 1978),
p. 106.
14 Subcommittee on Functions and Re
sponsibilities of Directors, “Corporate
Director’s Guidebook,” The Business
Lawyer 32 (November 1976): 35.

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES

The Need for a Requirement

Issue 1: Should audit committees

be required?
Consideration should be given to

the purpose of an audit committee
to determine whether a require
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ment for audit committees is
needed and, if so, to determine to
whom such a requirement should
apply and how the requirement
should be implemented.

Issue la: Is an audit committee
necessary to assist independent
directors in fulfilling their
responsibilities?
A number of advocates of the
establishment of audit committees
see them as a means of assisting
independent directors in fulfilling
their responsibilities to investors
and other outside interests. For ex
ample, the Corporate Directors
Guidebook describes the audit
committee as “the communication
link between the board of directors
as representatives of the stockhold
ers, on the one hand, and the inde
pendent auditors on the other
hand.” 15
In its findings in the investigation
of National Telephone Co. (de
scribed in Appendix C) the SEC
stated that there was a
need for adequate, regularized pro
cedures under the overall supervi
sion of the Board to ensure that
proper diclosures are being made.
Such procedures could include,
among other things, a functioning
Audit Committee with authority
over disclosure matters, or any other
procedure which involves the Board
of Directors in a meaningful way in
the disclosure process. With such
procedures, the corporation’s share
holders and the public should be
more adequately protected from
haphazard or fraudulent disclosure.

An audit committee gives inde
pendent directors a source of infor
mation on the operations of the
corporation that is independent of
management. It also allows the
independent directors an oppor
tunity to review information that is
reported to investors and the pub
lic. It may therefore be in the
public interest that corporations be
required to establish audit commit
tees.

to fulfill his responsibilities under
generally accepted auditing
standards?

Issue 1c: Is an audit committee
necessary to strengthen auditor
independence?

Present generally accepted audit
ing standards require the auditor to
communicate certain matters to the
board of directors or its audit com
mittee.
For example, Statement on Aud
iting Standards No. 17 requires the
auditor to report illegal acts de
tected in the audit to the appro
priate persons in the client’s organ
ization. SAS No. 17 goes on to
state—

A number of parties have seen
the audit committee as a means of
strengthening the independence of
the auditor. For example, the SEC
stated—

In some circumstances, the only
persons in the organization of a suf
ficiently high level of authority to
take necessary action may be the
audit committee or the board of
directors.16

Other requirements in the State
ments on Auditing Standards relate
to reporting to the audit committee
or board (1) the subsequent dis
covery of facts relating to previ
ously issued financial statements
and the refusal of the client to dis
close such facts, (2) material
weaknesses in internal accounting
controls, (3) nonconformity of in
terim financial information with
generally accepted accounting prin
ciples, and (4) detected errors or
irregularities in financial informa
tion. (See Appendix B for a de
scription of those requirements.)
When reporting such matters to
the directors, it may well be that
the auditor would be required to
provide information that is critical
of management. So an audit com
mittee of independent directors
may be necessary to permit free
and candid communication. A de
termination that an audit commit
tee is necessary for the auditor to
fulfill his responsibilities under
generally accepted auditing stand
ards may have implications for the
form of an audit committee re
quirement (see issue 5b) and for
the composition of the audit com
mittee (see issue 3a).

Issue lb: Is an audit committee
necessary for an auditor to be able
15 “Corporate Director’s Guidebook,” p.
35.

16 Statement on Auditing Standards No.
17 , Illegal Acts by Clients (January
1977), paragraph 13.

Such a committee would lessen the
accountants’ direct reliance on man
agement and would put them di
rectly in touch with outside mem
bers of the Board whose perform
ance was less specifically being re
ported on in the financial state
ments, thus increasing the account
ants’ independence.17

The chairman of the SEC has
also stated that audit committees
serve to strengthen the auditor’s
independence:
One of the avenues already avail
able for strengthening auditor inde
pendence is the formation of audit
committees composed of independ
ent corporate directors. In com
panies where the auditor reports to
an independent audit committee, a
potentially important buffer is pro
vided to insulate accountants from
inordinate management pressures
and to strengthen the auditor in his
relationship with management —
and hence his independence. Stated
differently, the absence of an audit
committee may diminish or impair
the ability of an auditor to be inde
pendent.18

The effect of the formation of an
audit committee on the indepen
dence of an auditor has also been
noted in the statements of the New
York Stock Exchange, the AICPA,
and others.
While it is generally agreed that
audit committees may strengthen
the auditor’s independence, it may
or may not be agreed that audit
committees are essential to main
taining the auditor’s independence.
In the past, it has not generally
been thought that the lack of an
audit committee impaired the audi

17 SEC, Accounting Series Release No.
165, December 20, 1974.
18 Harold M. Williams, address before
AICPA Fifth National Conference on
Current SEC Developments, Washing
ton, D.C., January 4, 1978.
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tor’s independence. The public’s
view of the auditor’s responsibili
ties has, however, changed in re
cent years, and the profession has
responded with more stringent
standards.
A requirement based solely on
the auditor’s independence, how
ever, may not be appropriate if
it is determined that the require
ment should not apply to all audit
clients. It may be difficult, if not
impossible, to justify how an audi
tor could be considered not inde
pendent with respect to certain
clients without audit committees
but independent with respect to
others.

Applicability of a Requirement
Issue 2: If audit committees are to
be required, to what entities should
the requirement apply?
A requirement for audit commit
tees may not be appropriate for all
entities for a variety of reasons. If
a requirement is needed, considera
tion must be given to the applica
bility of the requirement to various
types of entities.
A fundamental purpose of an
audit committee might be to pro
tect significant outside interests of
an entity (for example, large num
bers of equity owners or credi
tors). Significant outside interests
will benefit to the extent that an
audit committee improves the abil
ity of the auditor or the directors to
fulfill their responsibilities or
strengthens the independence of
the auditor.
The committee has identified the
following types of entities to whom
such a requirement may apply:

a.
b.
c.

All public entities
All SEC registrants
Certain SEC registrants

Issue 2a: Should a requirement
apply to all public entities?

To some extent, all economic en
tities have outside interests. Some
of those outside interests may have
little direct access to information
about the operations of the entity,
and therefore they must rely on in
dependent auditors and those per

sons in the entity comparable to
directors with responsibilities to
the outside interests. Therefore, cer
tain of those entities (for example,
nonprofit entities such as munici
palities or hospitals) may benefit
from forming a group to function
as an audit committee.
If a requirement is to apply to
such public entities, the definition
of those entities should be rea
sonably specific and unambiguous.
Consideration must also be given
to both the legal forms of those en
tities and the resulting responsibi
lities of those associated with the
entities to significant outside in
terests to determine who may ap
propriately serve on an audit com
mittee.
In corporations there are identi
fiable individuals—the directors—
with recognized responsibilities to
outside interest groups. Therefore,
it may be appropriate that an audit
committee requirement apply only
to corporations.
A requirement that all corpora
tions form an audit committee may,
however, be too broad. The over
whelming majority of corporations
are closely held and directed by
their owners. A requirement to
have independent directors for
those companies may not yield
benefits at least equal to the costs.

Issue 2b: Should a requirement
apply to all SEC registrants?
A requirement applying to all
SEC registrants has an advantage
in that it relates to a readily identi
fiable group. Moreover, SEC regis
trants are generally considered to
have a fairly large number of
shareholders who may be expected
to benefit from the establishment
of an audit committee. However,
some public companies, for ex
ample, certain banks and insurance
companies, are not required by the
securities acts to register with the
SEC. Those corporations, too,
might benefit from the establish
ment of an audit committee.
If audit committees are to be re
quired, consideration should be
given to the costs of the require
ment as well as the expected bene
fits. If the costs of an audit com

mittee requirement are too high,
companies may be discouraged
from entering the public capital
markets. The difficulties faced by
smaller companies in entering the
capital markets has recently been
a concern of the SEC and others.

Issue 2c: Should a requirement
apply only to certain SEC regis
trants?

A number of surveys have in
dicated that a large and growing
percentage of corporations already
have audit committees. A require
ment by the AICPA would there
fore not be a burden to those cor
porations. Unfortunately, most sur
veys have dealt only with the larger
corporations, and little is known
about the prevalence of audit com
mittees or outside directors in the
smaller SEC registrants. Roughly
11,000 corporations have securities
registered with the SEC. Ap
proximately 1,500 of those corpora
tions are listed on the New York
Stock Exchange and, as previously
noted, are already subject to its
audit committee requirement. Con
sideration should be given to the
need for, and the effects of, an
audit committee requirement for
the many relatively smaller SEC
registrants.
If an audit committee require
ment is relevant only to certain
registered corporations, that class
of corporations must be reasonably
defined. The definition must relate
the characteristics of that class of
corporations to the expected bene
fits of the requirement. A definition
may be based on such features as
the number of shareholders of the
corporation, the size of the corpora
tion based on amount of sales or
assets, the extent to which the
stock of the corporation is publicly
traded, whether the stock is listed
on an exchange or sold in some
other established market, or other
factors. For example, in Accounting
Series Release No. 177, the SEC
made a distinction among its regis
trants when it required certain dis
closures of interim information only
for those registrants whose income
or total assets exceed certain limits
and whose shares meet several

8
criteria establishing that they are
widely traded. Also, certain dis
closure requirements under gen
erally accepted accounting princi
ples apply only to “publicly traded”
companies, which are generally de
fined as those “whose securities
trade in a public market on either
(1) a stock exchange (domestic or
foreign) or (2) in the over-thecounter market (including securi
ties quoted only locally or re
gionally.)”19

Membership of Audit
Committees

Issue 3: What should be the re
quirements for the composition of
the audit committee and the quali
fications for membership?

For an audit committee to fulfill
its purpose, the members should be
able to operate independently of
management. If audit committees
are required, consideration should
be given to the composition of the
committee and the qualifications of
audit committee members. Ad
vocates of audit committees have
recommended that at least a ma
jority of the audit committee mem
bers be “independent,” and some
have recommended that all mem
bers be “independent.”
Issue 3a: Should all members of the
audit committee be independent of
management or is it sufficient that a
majority be independent?
A 1974 survey of its listed com
panies by the New York Stock Ex
change showed that in 84 percent
of the companies with audit com
mittees, the committees were made
up solely of independent direc
tors.20 The Exchange’s recent re
quirement for audit committees
mandates that the committees be

composed “solely of directors inde
pendent of management and free
from any relationship that, in the
opinion of its Board of Directors,
would interfere with the exercise
of independent judgment as a com
mittee member.”
On the other hand, some have
argued that management directors
may have a useful place on an audit
committee. Because of their know
ledge of the operations of the cor
poration, management directors
can usefully participate in the dis
cussions with the auditors, and
management should have an op
portunity to respond to the reports
of the auditor. It may not, how
ever, be necessary to have manage
ment representation on the audit
committee in order to allow them
access to the committee. It may be
that the presence of management
directors on the audit committee
will inhibit the auditor’s com
munication with the committee.

Issue 3b: Could the full board of
directors qualify effectively as an
audit committee?
If it is determined that it is suf
ficient that a majority, rather than
all, of the members of an audit
committee must be independent di
rectors, it may not always be neces
sary that a separate committee of
the board be formed to achieve the
objectives of an audit committee.
It may be that if a majority of the
members of the board of directors
are independent, the entire board
could function as an audit commit
tee. A 1973 survey of 855 corpora
tions showed that in 86 percent of
the nonmanufacturing companies
and 71 percent of the manufactur
ing companies, “outside directors”
were in the majority on the boards
of directors.21

Issue 3c: How should “indepen
dence” of directors be defined?
19 Accounting Principles Board Opinion
No. 28, Interim Financial Reporting
(May 1973). See also Financial Ac
counting Standards Board exposure
draft, Suspension of the Reporting of
Earnings per Share and Segment Infor
mation by Nonpublic Enterprises,
February 27, 1978.
20 New York Stock Exchange, “Response
to the White Paper Questionnaire,” p. 3.

If audit committees of indepen
dent directors are to be required, it

21 Jeremy Bacon, Corporate Directorship
Practices: Membership and Committees
of the Board (New York: Conference
Board, 1973), p. 2.

may be desirable to define or pro
vide guidance on the independence
of directors. For example, the re
quirement of the New York Stock
Exchange provides guidance on the
qualifications of audit committee
members that considers such fac
tors as whether a director is a
former officer of the company, or
whether the director has certain
business relationships with the
company. (See Appendix B for the
text of the requirement.)
Additional bases for determining
independence have also been sug
gested. For example, the survey by
Mautz and Neumann indicated that
a director who is affiliated with the
company’s primary underwriter
may be unacceptable as an audit
committee member.22 The report
of the Metcalf subcommittee re
commended that directors with
significant commercial relationships
with the company (for example,
commercial or investment bankers)
should not serve on audit commit
tees.
Issue 3d: What other qualifications
should be required?
Consideration should be given to
the desirability of providing gui
dance on qualifications of audit
committee members other than in
dependence. For example, the
Mautz and Neumann survey in
dicated that some expertise in
finance or accounting and know
ledge of the specific industry were
helpful.23 The effectiveness of an
audit committee may, however, de
pend more on the personal qualities
of the directors such as integrity,
judgment, intelligence, and a will
ingness to become actively involved
in the committee’s affairs.

Duties of Audit Committees

Issue 4: Should a requirement for
audit committees specify duties to
be performed by the committee?
The operations of an audit com
mittee should be flexible enough to
meet the needs of the directors, the

22 Mautz and Neumann, pp. 32-33.
23 Mautz and Neumann, p. 33.
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auditor, the company, and the in
vestors. A number of sources, how
ever, have suggested specific duties
to be performed by the audit com
mittee. (The duties assigned to the
audit committees of Killearn Prop
erties, Inc., and Phillips Petroleum
Co. as a result of settlements of
litigation are described in Appen
dixes D and E.) Among the duties
commonly ascribed to the audit
committee are these:
1. Nominate or select the in
dependent auditor
2. Review the arrangements
and scope of the indepen
dent auditor’s examination
3. Review the compensation
of the independent auditor
4. Consider the results of the
independent auditor’s review
of internal accounting con
trol and suggestions for im
provements
5. Discuss matters of concern
to the independent auditor
resulting from the audit
6. Review internal accounting
procedures with the com
pany’s financial and account
ing staff
7. Review the activities and
recommendations of the
company’s internal auditors

Additional duties sometimes sug
gested for the audit committee in
clude these:
8. Review and approve finan
cial information to be dis
tributed by the company to
the public
9. Review changes in account
ing principles in the finan
cial statements
10. Review nonauditing services
performed for the company
by the independent auditor
11. Establish and monitor pol
icies to prohibit unethical,
questionable, or illegal activ
ities by company employees
12. Review executive perqui
sites
13. Hold a prescribed minimum
number of meetings each
year

14. Report on the committee’s
activities in the annual re
port to shareholders
Rather than requiring the audit
committee to fulfill some of these
duties, it may be more practical to
achieve the same objectives by re
quiring the auditor to communicate
certain matters with the commit
tee, for example, by requiring the
auditor to consult with the audit
committee in planning his engage
ment.

Implementation of an AICPA
Requirement
Issue 5: If the AICPA should re
quire audit committees, in what
form should the requirement be im
plemented?
The committee has identified
three possible forms an audit com
mittee requirement of the AICPA
might take if it is determined that
such a requirement is appropriate:

• An amendment of the AICPA
Code of Professional Ethics
rule on independence
• A Statement on Auditing Stan
dards
• A membership requirement
for the SEC practice section
of the AICPA Division for
CPA Firms
Issue 5a: Should a requirement for
audit committees be implemented
as an amendment to the AICPA
Code of Professional Ethics rule on
independence?
Amendments to the AICPA
Code of Professional Ethics must
be approved by a vote of the Insti
tute’s members.
Rule 101 of the Code of Profes
sional Ethics states—
A member or a firm of which he is
a partner or shareholder shall not
express an opinion on financial
statements of an enterprise unless
he and his firm are independent
with respect to such enterprise.

For an audit committee require
ment to be implemented by an
amendment of the independence
rule, it must be determined that

the auditor’s independence is suf
ficiently strengthened by the exis
tence of an audit committee to
justify such a rule. In its state
ments encouraging the formation of
audit committees, the SEC has
described the benefits of audit
committees mainly in terms of
strengthening the auditor’s inde
pendence. It should be noted, how
ever, that under the securities
acts, the SEC’s principal authority
with respect to auditors is through
its power to define independence.
While it has been noted that
audit committees may strengthen
the auditor’s independence, it has
not generally been conceded that
audit committees are essential to
independence. In the past, auditors
have not been considered to lack
independence solely because of a
lack of an audit committee. The
public’s view of the responsibilities
of the auditor has been changing,
however, and the profession has
responded with standards that have
been more stringent than those of
the past.
If it is determined that a require
ment for audit committees should
not apply to all corporations, then a
requirement based solely on the
auditor’s independence may not be
appropriate. It may be difficult to
justify how an auditor could be
considered not independent with
respect to certain clients without
audit committees but to be con
sidered independent with respect
to others.
If the functions of an audit com
mittee are broader than solely assur
ing the independence of auditors,
an amendment of the AICPA Code
of Professional Ethics may not be
the appropriate form of require
ment. Also, the Code of Profes
sional Ethics may not be the appro
priate vehicle to provide guidance
on the operations of audit commit
tees if it is determined that such
guidance is desirable.

Issue 5b: Should a requirement for
audit committees be implemented
by a Statement on Auditing Stan
dards?
Statements on Auditing Stan
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dards, which are promulgated by
the AICPA Auditing Standards
Executive Committee and are en
forceable under the AICPA Code
of Professional Ethics, now des
cribe several circumstances in
which it may be necessary for the
auditor to communicate with the
client’s board of directors or its
audit committee. (See Appendix
B.) It may be desirable that State
ments on Auditing Standards re
quire that clients establish audit
committees in part to assure that
such communication is effective.
The improvements in the auditor’s
independence and the assistance in
satisfying the disclosure responsi
bilities of independent directors
may be additional justification for
a Statement on Auditing Standards
requiring audit committees.
A requirement as a Statement on
Auditing Standards could take one
of two forms:

may also be more readily recog
nized and accessible to clients
than might ethics rules or member
ship requirements of the SEC prac
tice section. A Statement on Audit
ing Standards may, therefore, be
the appropriate vehicle if it is de
sirable to provide guidance on the
operations of audit committees as
well as to establish requirements.
A requirement for audit commit
tees might make it necessary for a
Statement on Auditing Standards to
define its applicability to particu
lar clients. Statements on Auditing
Standards do not now make such
distinctions. In this regard, the
Commission on Auditors’ Responsi
bilities has recommended that all
audits be subject to the same stan
dards. The commission recognized,
however, that the appropriate
auditing procedures will vary with
the characteristics of individual
clients.

1. It could prohibit the inde
pendent auditor from giving
an opinion on financial state
ments of certain specified
clients that do not have audit
committees.
2. It could require the auditor
to modify his report on the
financial statements of a client
that does not have an audit
committee by adding an addi
tional paragraph, either with
or without qualification of the
auditor’s opinion.

Issue 5c: Should a requirement for
audit committees be implemented
by a membership requirement of
the SEC Practice Section of the
AICPA Division for CPA Firms?

As an ethics rule or as a mem
bership requirement of the SEC
practice section of the AICPA, an
audit committee requirement could
only take the form of a prohibition
against giving opinions on the fi
nancial statements of corporations
without audit committees. Only a
Statement on Auditing Standards
could require the auditor to modify
his report on financial statements
if the client has no audit commit
tee.
A Statement on Auditing Stan
dards can deal more broadly with
the relationships of auditors and
audit committees. It is not limited
to one aspect of the relationship,
such as the auditor’s independence.
Statements on Auditing Standards

In September, 1977, the AICPA
Council established the SEC prac
tice section of the AICPA Division
for CPA Firms. An objective of the
SEC practice section is to “improve
the quality of practice by CPA firms
before the Securities and Exchange
Commission through the establish
ment of practice requirements for
member firms.” Those require
ments are established by the sec
tion’s executive committee and are
subject to review by its public
oversight board.
If it is determined that an audit
committee requirement should
apply only to SEC registrants, a
membership requirement of the
SEC practice section might be
an appropriate method of imple
mentation. Such a requirement
might prohibit member firms from
accepting audit engagements for
certain companies without audit
committees. The present member
ship requirements of the SEC prac
tice section already require the
auditor to report certain matters to
the client’s audit committee or the

board of directors.
A membership requirement of
the SEC practice section may not
be appropriate if an audit commit
tee requirement is to apply to a
class of entities broader than SEC
registrants or only to certain types
of SEC registrants.
The membership requirement
approach may have several draw
backs. Although the auditing firms
of the vast majority of SEC regis
trants (over 460 CPA firms) have
applied, membership is voluntary.
A membership requirement would
also require the development of
suitable sanctions for noncom
pliance. Member firms may also
encounter difficulty in convincing
clients to recognize its member
ship requirement in the SEC prac
tice section.
The executive committee is re
stricted from setting membership
requirements that “unreasonably
preclude membership by any CPA
firm.” If an audit committee re
quirement is to be established by a
membership requirement, it must
be determined that no firm is so
precluded. (See issue 7.)
Alternatives to an AICPA
Requirement

Issue 6: If an audit committee re
quirement should not be imple
mented by the AICPA, should the
requirement be implemented in
some other manner?

As already noted, the SEC and
certain members of Congress have
recommended that the AICPA
should establish a requirement for
audit committees. However, if for
some reason it may be inappropriate
for the AICPA to make such a re
quirement, consideration should be
given to other means of implement
ing a requirement. Alternative
forms of an audit committee re
quirement may include regulations
by the SEC or other federal
agencies, federal legislation, or
state legislation.
Competitive Effects

Issue 7: Will a requirement for
audit committees have an economic
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or competitive impact on public
accounting firms?
One of the suggested duties of an
audit committee is to recommend
or select the independent auditors.
It has been suggested that in select
ing the auditors, independent di
rectors may favor larger, better
known public accounting firms. A
requirement for audit committees
could therefore have an anticom
petitive impact on the accounting
profession to the detriment of
smaller public accounting firms.
The committee therefore solicits
comments on whether an audit
committee requirement would have
an economic or competitive impact
on public accounting firms, the
nature and extent of the impact, if
any, and the features of an audit
committee requirement that might
create such an impact.

Auditor Attendance at
Stockholder Meetings
Issue 8: Should the independent
auditor be required to be present
and available to answer questions
at the annual meeting of stock
holders?

While this matter is not directly

related to the issue of audit com
mittees, it does involve similar
questions of applicability and im
plementation, and therefore the
AICPA Board of Directors recom
mended that the possibility of such
a requirement should also be con
sidered.
Regarding this issue, the report
of the Commission on Auditors’ Re
sponsibilities stated—
Fulfilling the reasonable expecta
tions of users for access to the
auditor within the limitations im
posed on such communication could
be accomplished by a requirement
that the auditor be present and
available to answer questions at the
annual meeting of the shareholders..
The same requirement should apply
to due diligence meetings, which
are held before securities are issued.
We recommend that companies and
their auditors undertake to arrange
and announce such auditor atten
dance.24

Also, SEC regulations now re
quire disclosure in the proxy state
ment of (1) whether representa

24 Commission on Auditors’ Responsibili
ties, Report, Conclusions, and Recom
mendations, p. 84.

tives of the principal independent
auditors for the current year and
for the most recently completed
fiscal year are expected to be pre
sent at the stockholders’ meeting
with the opportunity to make a
statement and (2) whether they
will be available to answer ques
tions.
A requirement that the indepen
dent auditor be present at the
stockholders’ meeting would in
volve some cost for companies. That
cost may fall proportionately more
heavily on smaller companies. It
may therefore be necessary to
define the class of corporations to
which such a requirement would
apply.
If it is desirable that such a re
quirement be established, consi
deration should be given to the
means of enforcing the requirement
and the action the independent
auditor should take if he is not in
vited to the stockholders’ meeting.
It would also be necessary to
consider the most appropriate
means of implementing such a re
quirement—as a Statement on
Auditing Standards or a member
ship requirement of the SEC prac
tice section.
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APPENDIX A

NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AUDIT COMMITTEE POLICY

Each domestic company with common stock listed on the Exchange, as a condition of listing and
continued listing of its securities on the Exchange, shall establish no later than June 30, 1978, and
maintain thereafter an Audit Committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and
free from any relationship that, in the opinion of its Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise
of independent judgment as a committee member. Directors who are affiliates of the company or officers
or employees of the company or its subsidiaries would not be qualified for Audit Committee membership.

A director who was formerly an officer of the company or any of its subsidiaries may qualify for member
ship even though he may be receiving pension or deferred compensation payments from the company
if, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, such person will exercise independent judgment and will
materially assist the function of the committee. However, a majority of the Audit Committee shall be
directors who were not formerly officers of the company or any of its subsidiaries.
Supplementary Material

In order to deal with the complex relationships that arise, the following guidelines are provided to
assist Boards of Directors to observe the spirit of the policy in selecting members of the Audit Committee.

A director who has, or is a partner, officer, or director of an organization that has, customary com
mercial, industrial, banking, or underwriting relationships with the company which are carried on in the
ordinary course of business on an arms-length basis may qualify for membership unless, in the opinion
of the Board of Directors, such director is not independent of management or the relationship would
interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee member.
A director who, in addition to fulfilling the customary director’s role, also provides additional services
directly for the Board of Directors and is separately compensated therefor, would nonetheless qualify
for membership on the Audit Committee. However, a director who, in addition to his director’s role,
also acts on a regular basis as an individual or representative of an organization serving as a professional
advisor, legal counsel or consultant to management, would not qualify if, in the opinion of the Board
of Directors, such relationship is material to the company, the organization represented or the director.
A director who represents or is a close relative of a person who would not qualify as a member of the
Audit Committee in the light of the policy would likewise not qualify for the committee. However, if
the director is a close relative of an employee who is not an executive officer or if there are valid
countervailing reasons, the Board of Directors’ decision as to eligibility shall govern.

While SEC Rule 405 may be helpful to the Board of Directors in determining whether a particular
director is an “affiliate” or a close relative for purposes of this policy, it is not intended to be so
technically applied as to go beyond the spirit of this policy.
January 6, 1977

APPENDIX B

REFERENCES IN STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS
TO AUDIT COMMITTEES AND BOARDS OF DIRECTORS

A review of Statements on Auditing Standards Nos. 1 through 21 indicates several situations in which
an independent auditor should communicate information known to him to an appropriate level of his
client’s management, including the board of directors or the audit committee. These situations generally
occur when, in the performance of his work, the auditor becomes aware of an unusual or abnormal
condition. References to these situations are found in the following sections:
323.01, .04 (SAS No. 20)
327.14
(SAS No.16)
328.13
, .18 (SASNo. 17)
561.05, .08 (SAS No. 1)
720.06, .15,.18 (SAS No. 10)

The following SASs describe circumstances in which it may be necessary for the auditor to report to
management or the board of directors:
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1. SAS No. 1, section 561, “Subsequent Discovery of Facts Existing at Date of Report,” paragraph
4, states:
When the auditor becomes aware of information which relates to financial statements previously
reported on by him, but which was not known to him at the date of his report, and which is of such
a nature and from such a source that he would have investigated it had it come to his attention
during the course of his examination, he should, as soon as practicable, undertake to determine whether
the information is reliable and whether the facts existed at the date of his report. In this connection, the
auditor should discuss the matter with his client at whatever management levels he deems appropriate,
including the board of directors, and request cooperation in whatever investigation may be necessary.

Paragraph 8 describes what the auditor should do if the client does not adequately disclose the
subsequent information:
If the client refuses to make the disclosures specified in paragraph 6, the auditor should notify each
member of the board of directors of such refusal and of the fact that, in the absence of disclosure by the
client, the auditor will take steps ... to prevent future reliance upon his report.

2. SAS No. 10 (section 720) “Limited Review of Interim Financial Information,” paragraph 6, states
that the objective of a limited review is a report to the board of directors:
The objective of a limited review of interim financial information is to provide the accountant with a
basis for reporting to the board of directors on those matters that he believes should be brought to its
attention, based upon applying his objectivity and knowledge of financial reporting practices to significant
accounting matters of which he becomes aware through inquiries and analytical procedures.

Paragraph 15 of the statement also describes the auditor’s responsibility to report to the board of
directors when, in the course of performing a limited review, he becomes aware of weaknesses in
internal accounting control:
If the system of internal accounting control appears to contain weaknesses that do not permit prepara
tion of interim financial information in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, and,
as a consequence, it is impracticable for the accountant to effectively apply his knowledge of financial
reporting practices to the interim financial information, he should advise the board of directors of the
circumstances. The accountant also may wish to submit suggestions for changes in the system to permit
the preparation of appropriate interim financial information.

Paragraph 18 describes the auditor’s responsibility when he believes that the interim information
presented does not conform to generally accepted accounting principles:
If, in performing a limited review, information comes to the accountant’s attention that leads him to
question whether the interim financial information to be reported conforms with generally accepted
accounting principles, he should make additional inquiries or employ other procedures he considers
appropriate to permit him to report informatively to the board of directors.

3. SAS No. 16 (section 327), “The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the Detection of Errors
or Irregularities,” paragraph 14, describes the auditor’s responsibility when he believes that material
errors or irregularities may exist (This statement was the first to specify notifying the audit
committee as an alternative to notifying the full board.):
If the independent auditor’s examination causes him to believe that material errors or irregularities may
exist, he should consider their implications and discuss the matter and the extent of any further investiga
tion with an appropriate level of management that is at least one level above those involved. If after
such discussions the auditor continues to believe that material errors or irregularities may exist, he
should determine that the board of directors or its audit committee is aware of the circumstances. Also,
he should attempt to obtain sufficient evidential matter to determine whether in fact material errors or
irregularities exist and, if so, their effect.

4. SAS No. 17 (section 328), “Illegal Acts by Clients,” paragraph 13, describes the auditor’s actions
after discovery of an illegal act by his client:
After it has been determined that an illegal act has occurred, the auditor should report the circum
stances to personnel within the client’s organization at a high enough level of authority so that
appropriate action can be taken by the client with respect to—
a. consideration of remedial actions;
b. adjustments or disclosures that may be necessary in the financial statements;
c. disclosures that may be required in other documents (such as a proxy statement).
In some circumstances, the only persons in the organization of a sufficiently high level of authority to
take necessary action may be the audit committee or the board of directors. The auditor should also
consider the implications of an illegal act in relation to the intended degree of reliance to be placed on
internal accounting control and the representations of management.

Paragraph 18 gives the auditor further guidance when he is not satisfied by his client’s action with
respect to the illegal act:
When an illegal act, including one that does not have a material effect on the financial statements,
comes to the auditor’s attention, he should consider the nature of the act and management’s consideration
once the matter is brought to their attention. If the client’s board of directors, its audit committee,
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or other appropriate levels within the organization do not give appropriate consideration to the illegal
act, the auditor should consider withdrawing from the current engagement or dissociating himself from
any future relationship with the client.

5. SAS No. 20 (section 323), “Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal Account
ing Control,” paragraph 4, describes the auditor’s reporting responsibility when he discovers material
weaknesses:
The independent auditor should communicate to senior management and to the board of directors
or its audit committee (or the equivalent level of authority, such as a board of trustees) any material
weaknesses that come to his attention during the course of his examination of the financial statements
if such weaknesses have not been corrected before they come to his attention.

APPENDIX C

SUMMARY OF SEC FINDINGS IN
THE MATTER OF NATIONAL TELEPHONE CO.
In its investigation, the SEC found that during a period in which National Telephone Co. faced serious
cash flow difficulties, the company made public disclosures (including press releases and letters to stock
holders) which did not disclose the problems but which reported high earnings and “rosy projections of
growth.” Furthermore, the SEC found that the outside directors were aware of the company’s troubled
financial condition and were also aware of the optimistic disclosures.
Only one of the company’s seven directors, the chairman, was an officer of the corporation. The
company had an audit committee of three outside directors, but the committee never met.
Though they were aware of the facts, the outside directors “did not take meaningful steps to see to it
that adequate disclosure be made.” One director wrote to the chairman of the company threatening
resignation unless the management kept the board more adequately informed. Apart from that, the
SEC found that the directors “did nothing effective to ensure that they be provided accurate current
information.”
With regard to the responsibilities of outside directors, the SEC concluded:
In general, outside directors should be expected to maintain a general familiarity with their company’s
communications with the public. In this way, they can compare such communications with what they
know to be the facts, and if the facts as they know them are inconsistent with those communications,
they can see to it, as stewards for the company, that appropriate revisions or additions be made.

With regard to the audit committee, the SEC concluded:
Finally, the facts developed during this investigation demonstrate the need for adequate, regularized
procedures under the overall supervision of the Board to ensure that proper disclosures are being made.
Such procedures could include, among other things, a functioning Audit Committee with authority over
disclosure matters, or any other procedure which involves the Board of Directors in a meaningful way
in the disclosure process. With such procedures, the corporation’s shareholders and the public should
be more adequately protected from haphazard or fraudulent disclosure.

Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14380, January 16, 1978,
“Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co., Inc., Relating to Activities of the
Outside Directors of National Telephone Co., Inc.”

APPENDIX D

SUMMARY OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT IN
SEC. v. KILLEARN PROPERTIES, INC.

SEC v. Killearn Properties, Inc. resulted in a consent decree in which the company agreed, among
other things, that a majority of the directors of the company would be outside directors. “Outside directors”
were generally defined as those who in the five years prior to their election had not been employed by
Killearn or its related parties or who were not direct or indirect owners of more than 2 percent of any
class of equity securities of Killearn or its affiliates.
Killearn also consented to a requirement that the board of directors form an audit committee of three
outside directors. The duties of the audit committee would include—
1.

Review the arrangements and scope of the audit and the compensation of the auditor.
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2. Review with the independent auditor and the company’s chief financial officer the company’s
internal accounting controls.
3. Review with the auditor the results of the audit including—
a. The auditor’s report
b. The auditor’s perception of the company’s financial and accounting personnel
c. Cooperation received by the auditor
d. Steps to make the audit more efficient
e. Significant unusual transactions
f. Changes in accounting principles
g. Significant adjustments proposed by the auditor
h. Recommendations by the auditor with regard to internal accounting controls
4. Inquire concerning deviations from the company’s code of conduct and periodically review that code.
5. Meet at least twice a year with the company’s financial and accounting staff to review internal
accounting and auditing procedures.
6. Recommend to the board the retention or discharge of the independent auditors.
7. Review all public releases of financial information.
8. Review activities of officers and directors in dealing with the company.
The audit committee would also be authorized to conduct investigations related to carrying out its
duties and to approve settlements of certain litigation involving the company’s officers.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Killearn Properties, Inc., No. TCA-75-67 (N.D. Fla., May, 1977).

APPENDIX E

EXCERPT FROM NOTICE TO STOCKHOLDERS OF
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY CONCERNING HEARING ON
CONFIRMATION OF SETTLEMENT IN GILBAR v. KEELER

The Board of Directors shall appoint an Audit Committee, composed of at least three members and
consisting only of independent outside directors, to recommend independent public accountants to the
Board and to review and make recommendations to the Board concerning the audit. Only independent
outside directors shall be authorized to vote on the selection or retention of independent public ac
countants. In addition to nominating independent public accountants to the Board, the Audit Committee
shall have the following responsibilities:

1. It shall recommend to the Board an independent public accountant to fill any vacancy until the
next stockholders meeting.
2. It shall arrange details of the independent public accountant’s engagement, including the compen
sation to be paid.
3. It shall review with Phillips’ independent public accountants, as well as Phillips’ Comptroller and
other appropriate company personnel, the following matters: (i) Phillips’ general policies and
procedures with respect to audits and accounting and financial controls; and (ii) the general
accounting and reporting principles and practices which should be applied in preparing Phillips’
financial statements and conducting financial audits of its affairs.
4. It shall meet with the independent public accountants as required, but at least twice a year, and
shall review with them Phillips’ interim and year-end financial statements, any certification, report,
or opinion which the independent public accountants propose to render in connection with such
statements, and any other appropriate matter.
5. It shall meet with Phillips’ internal audit staff at least twice a year and review all financial statements
and the extent to which Phillips’ accounting staff has implemented any reforms proposed by either
the Audit Committee or the independent public accountants.
6. It shall have the power to direct an investigation by the independent public accountants and/or
Phillips’ internal audit staff into any matter related to Phillips’ business and affairs.
7. It shall recommend to the Board the policies which the Board should adopt and actions the Board
should take to prevent any payments constituting an unlawful or improper use of Phillips’ funds,
including the payment of finders’, promoters’, or consultants’ commissions or fees.
Gilbar v. Keeler, Civ. No. 75-611 (C.D. Cal., February 18, 1978).
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